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Whilst the theoretical case in favour of a tax on the value of land (a land tax) is well established, 
examples of its implementation in practice are relatively few in number.  Where a land tax is levied, 
it is often part of a suite of land and property taxes that includes transfer taxes, wealth taxes 
betterment and recurrent taxes on land and property.  Rarely is a land tax the sole mechanism for 
taxing real estate.  Yet there is no shortage of land tax supporters, even in countries where other 
forms of real estate tax have a long history.  England is one such country, where real estate taxes 
have existed since the 17th century in one form or another.  Despite coming close at the beginning 
of the 19th century, governments on the left, right and in the centre ground of political discourse 
have not implemented a land tax. 
 
In the land tax debate throughout this period, there was an absence of empirical research to 
underpin the positions adopted by either proponents of a land tax or defenders of the status quo. It 
was not until 1964 that a small pilot exercise was undertaken to investigate the implications of 
introducing a land tax in England.  This seems odd given that frequently cited criticisms of a land tax 
centre on its practical difficulties.  This paper, therefore, looks at some of the consequences of 
switching from recurrent real estate taxes that are based on the value of land and improvements to 
one that is based on the value of land only.  Focusing on one local authority area in the south east of 
England, the paper answers the following questions: how might the valuation of land be undertaken 
in a developed economy where most transactional evidence relates to land together with 
improvements, and what are the revenue implications of switching from a tax where the liability falls 
on the land owner rather than the property occupier in first instance.  In particular, who are the 
winners and losers and does expansion of the tax base to include agricultural land uses significantly 














Whilst the theoretical case in favour of a tax on the value of land (a land tax) is well established, 
examples of its implementation in practice are relatively few in number.  Where a land tax is levied, 
it is often part of a suite of land and property taxes that includes transfer taxes, wealth taxes 
betterment and recurrent land taxes.  Rarely is a land tax the sole mechanism for taxing real estate. 
 
Yet there is no shortage of land tax supporters, even in countries where other forms of real estate 
tax have a long history.  England is one such country, where real estate taxes have existed since the 
17th century in one form or another.  Taking the form of local rates, land and property taxation first 
appeared in the UK in the 16th century following the Reformation, but it was not until 1909 that, 
under the influence of Henry George, the Liberal Government introduced a recurrent land value tax.  
However, the tax did not survive long enough to be implemented and was eventually abolished 
following a change of Government in 1922.  In the decades that followed, despite sound theoretical 
arguments  in support of land value taxation, coupled with strong lobbying, a land value tax has not 
been implemented in England. 
 
It is interesting to note that, in the land tax debate throughout this period, there was an absence of 
empirical research to underpin the positions adopted by either proponents of a land tax or 
defenders of the status quo.  The debate was a political, ideological and theoretical one (McGill and 
Plimmer, 2004).  It was not until 1964 that a small pilot exercise was undertaken to investigate the 
implications of introducing a land tax in England.  This seems odd given that frequently cited 
criticisms of a land tax centre on technical difficulties, and particularly the need to value land 
separate from any improvements even though most transactional evidence relates to land and 
improvements combined.  It would be useful to investigate these difficulties to see if circumstances 
have changed.  This paper, therefore, models the possible consequences of switching from recurrent 
real estate taxes that are based on land and improvements (or land and property) to one that is 
based on the value of land only, and from shifting the initial liability for payment of the tax from 
property occupiers to land owners.  Focusing on one local authority area in the south east of 







 How might the valuation of land be undertaken England where most transactional evidence 
relates to land and property? 
 What are the revenue implications of switching from a tax where the liability falls on the land 
owner rather than the property occupier in first instance?  In particular, who are the winners 
and losers and does inclusion of agricultural land uses in the tax base significantly increase tax 
revenue? 
 
2. THE THEORETICAL CASE FOR A LAND TAX 
 
The theoretical case for a recurrent tax based on the value of land is well documented. Classical and 
neo-classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall 
demonstrated that the economic rent (and its capitalised equivalent, value) which land is able to 
earn over and above the return generated after optimally employing labour and capital is 
determined by its scarcity and its location, neither of which are derived from any productive activity 
on the part of the landowner.  Land value is, therefore, the price of monopoly: the scarcer and less 
substitutable a parcel of land is, and the more attractive the location in relation to the market and 
factors of production, the more valuable the land. 
 
Land use planning and regulation, which are not the result of landowner action, create further 
scarcity, increasing the value of land in specific locations.  At the land parcel level, the grant of 
permission to develop land (including changing its use) can generate substantial increases in land 
value.  In societies where governments provide infrastructure, services and amenities, landowners 
may also benefit from value uplift as a direct result of this publicly funded investment and it is 
argued that the public has a legitimate claim to this land value. 
 
Who receives economic rent depends on who owns the land and the mechanisms in place to collect 
it.  Debate over entitlement to these legal rights over land (including the right to use, exclude others, 
reap economic benefit, transfer, inherit, etc.) has a recorded history of at least four centuries: 
whether such rights should be privately owned and state protected (Locke, Bentham) or publicly 
owned (Rousseau, Marx).  As global population and the rate of urbanisation increase, pressure on 
land resources grows, and the philosophical debate over land rights intensifies, with socioeconomic 







In countries where property rights are held privately, the combination of private property rights and 
monopoly land value creates two social costs: unearned land value (or wealth) and unequal 
distribution of that wealth. One means of recovering unearned land value is a tax.  Adam Smith 
argued that a tax on land value would not harm economic activity and would not increase land rents. 
The idea of a recurrent tax on land value has been propounded ever since with 19th century liberal 
economist Henry George making the most well-known case for a single tax on land value (George, 
2005).  However, a single tax on land that replaces all other taxes has not been introduced, the most 
likely reason being that a wealth tax on such a scale could dramatically reduce land values.  Instead, 
the idea of a land tax as a single land and property tax has been advocated, but these are usually at 
low rates and capture only a small fraction of value. 
 
Other reasons why land tax is regarded as beneficial are that it: does not distort choices as to how 
much to invest in improvements (Dye and England, 2010); it can encourage optimum use of land 
(Commission on Local Tax Reform, 2015 Vol 3, p.26-7) and reuse of vacant land (Lyons Inquiry into 
Local Government, 2005, p.76); by raising the holding cost of land, it may discourage land banking 
and speculation and encourage development; and it may encourage denser development (subject to 
planning) and therefore limit urban sprawl 
 
Although the theoretical case for taxing land is well established, there are legitimate reasons for 
taxing improvements too.  Occupiers of improved land consume local services and benefit from local 
amenities and this service provision needs funding, leading to a case for taxing the value of 
improvements. Mirrlees et al (2011) suggest that land and improvements should be thought of as 
distinct bases for taxation, given that the investment in improvements does not always correlate 
with the use of services.  In reality, many countries’ taxes are levied on their combined value and 
therefore have what could be considered as a dual role: tax on services used (waste collection, road 
repairs, etc.) and value of land in the basis of its existing (i.e. unimproved) use.  They also argue that 
only residential improvements should be taxed since business premises are an input into the 
production process so taxing them would distort choices firms make about production (Mirrlees et 
al, 2011:376). 
 
Lichfield et al stressed the need to ensure land taxation is compatible with development planning 
and Connellan (2004) explores the moral and ethical rationale for land taxation, as well its practical 
operation in the UK.  Dunne (2005) and Dye and England (2011) also consider the practical issues 






2013b) investigate the potential for implementing a land tax in the British Isles and in Ireland.  More 
recently, Corlett et al (2018) suggest replacing Business Rates and Stamp Duty Land Tax on 
commercial transactions with a commercial landowner levy, in other words a land value tax on 
owners. 
 
3. LAND AND PROPERTY TAXATION 
 
Despite the theoretical case for a tax on the unearned wealth arising from land ownership, an all-
encompassing land tax is a rarity.  Instead, a land tax usually sits alongside a gamut of direct land and 
property taxes which can be classified in different ways. Figure 1 categorises them as recurrent 
(usually annual) taxes and event-based taxes.  These taxes will directly affect land value as the cost 
of the tax can be capitalised and deducted from the price paid for land.  In addition to these are 
indirect taxes on land and property: VAT, which may be charged on the sale or lease of commercial 
property; and income tax and corporation tax, which are charged on rental income and profits from 
property investment.  These are less likely to be directly reflected as capitalised deductions from 
land value as their incidence and magnitude are dependent on taxpayer decisions and status. 
 
Figure 1 – Direct land and property taxes 
 
Recurrent land and property taxes are usually assessed with reference to value of land (a land tax) or 































(rental) or the capital value of the land parcel.  Event-based taxes include transfer taxes, wealth 
taxes and betterment taxes. Table 1 summarises the key attributes of each of these taxes. 
 
Table 1 – Key attributes of land and property taxes 
Type of tax Description Occurrence Liability Incidence 
Recurrent tax A tax usually levied to help pay 





Transfer tax % price agreed on transfer of 
ownership 
On transfer Owners Transfer 
Betterment 
tax 
On increase in value 
attributable to granting of 
development rights 









Accruing to property asset(s) 
whose value has appreciated 
over time 







On the value of property owned 
at death 
On death Owners Wealth, 
Transfer 
 
In England, all attempts to tax value arising specifically from the grant of consent and the exercise of 
development rights, of which there have been four since 1947, have been short-lived and resulted in 
failure both in revenue terms and in bringing forward land for development.  What exists in terms of 
event-based land and property taxes is transfer tax, capital gains tax, inheritance tax, and local 
betterment taxes (in the form of ‘planning obligations’ and infrastructure levy).  England has two 
forms of recurrent property tax that are both based on the combined value of land and property. 
These are Council Tax, which is levied on domestic properties, and Business Rates levied on non-
domestic properties. The taxable entity for both of these taxes is the occupier in the first instance, 
although owners become liable if the property is unoccupied. 
 
Council Tax is based on capital values of dwellings.  Each local authority administers and collects the 
tax and decides how tax revenue is spent.  There are eight council tax bands, from A (lowest) to H 
(highest). These bands are based on estimations of the market value of residential properties as at 1 






being a fixed proportion of that band D charge.  Business Rates are based on annual rental values 
and are revalued on a five-yearly basis.  The valuations are undertaken by a central government 
agency and the tax rate is set by central government each year, but individual local councils 
administer and collect the tax. Business Rates raise more revenue than council tax despite a far 
smaller tax base.  There are a range of reliefs from these taxes; the main one is agricultural land and 
buildings.  Table 2 summarises the characteristics of Council Tax and Business Rates. 
 
Table 2 – Attributes of Council tax and Business Rates 
Council Tax Business Rates 
Based on value bands Based on spot values 
Based on capital values Based on annual rental values 
Local authorities set rate Central government sets rate 
Tax is collected by local authorities 
Occupiers liable (owners if property is empty) 
Based on 1991 values and never been revalued Revalued every five years (seven years in one 
case) 
Various reliefs and exemptions, the main one 
being 25% discount for single occupancy 
Various reliefs and exemptions, the main one 
being exemption for agricultural land and 
woodland 
 
Council Tax is regressive in two ways. First, the tax rate declines when moving from lower to higher 
value bands.  Roughly speaking the percentage increase in bills between bands is half the percentage 
increase in property values (Hills and Sutherland, 1991).  Second, the absence of revaluations means 
that increases in land value are not being taxed and geographical shifts in land value are not 
reflected.  For example, in Table 3 it can be seen that 1995 the mean house price in the North of 
England was 25% below the mean for England and the south east was 19% above.  By 2018 the 
North was 46% below and the south east was 30% above.  Although house prices vary widely with 
each region, there has been a significant shift in prices from the north to the south, and this is not 
reflected in the 1991 values on which the Council Tax bandings are based.   
 

















East Anglia £60,728 -11% £276,485 -8% 
East Midlands £54,243 -20% £218,553 -28% 
Greater London £97,707 44% £622,813 118% 
North £50,675 -25% £169,594 -46% 
North West £50,096 -26% £194,195 -37% 
South East £80,515 19% £379,453 30% 
South West £66,294 -2% £290,662 -2% 
Wales £51,287 -24% £183,014 -41% 
West Midands £58,884 -13% £227,172 -25% 
Yorks and Humber £54,117 -20% £191,736 -38% 




Source: HM Land Registry House Price Index 
 
Leishman et al (2004) looked at alternatives to the Council Tax system and Corlett and Gardiner 
(2013) provide a critique of the Council Tax and suggests replacing it with a progressive property tax.  
Business Rates are a tax on land and property and therefore it is, at least in part, economically 
inefficient as it taxes a production input.  There are also some discounts for empty properties and 
this acts as a disincentive for reuse.  
 
 
4. IMPLEMENTING A LAND TAX AS A REPLACEMENT FOR A PROPERTY TAX 
 
There are a number of issues that need to be considered when deciding whether to introduce a land 
tax as a replacement for a property tax. 
 
The first issue is the windfall loss incurred by owners of land as the tax base shifts from occupiers to 
owners. The main losers when switching from an occupation tax such as business rates to a land tax 
would be land-extensive businesses (IPPR, 2005). A broader, more inclusive tax base means that tax 
rates for everyone can be lower, but the UN (2011) notes that taxation of agricultural land or forest 
land can be politically sensitive. This may explain to some degree why many countries with a land tax 
apply special reliefs to agriculture, through full or partial exemptions, or lower tax rates (Norregaard, 
2013).  Also, the impact on other taxes needs to be carefully considered.  Further, in most countries 







Second, in their review of international literature, Gibb and Christie (2015) note that there is a risk 
that introducing a land tax may initially lead to significant land value reductions as a result of the 
capitalisation of future tax liabilities into the value of land.  This could have significant implications 
for economies that rely on the wealth stored in property values as collateral for debt.  To counter 
such a fall in values, a transitional arrangement might be appropriate, perhaps phasing in the land 
tax or offering compensation to those initially affected.   
 
Third, because a land tax is usually levied on owners, this can cause confusion over the purpose of 
the tax.  Local taxation is often regarded as a benefit or service tax to pay for the provision of local 
infrastructure, services and amenities.  Therefore, occupiers of land, together with improvements to 
the land, would be the appropriate taxable entities.  However, if the tax is also in part a wealth tax 
designed to capture uplift in value resulting from the provision of local infrastructure, services and 
amenities, then the landowner would be the appropriate taxable entity.  In reality, a land tax is a 
hybrid benefit tax and wealth tax.  The confusion stems from the fact that the tax is assessed by 
reference to values.  Is the tax based on values to capture greater taxes from those with higher value 
properties or is it based on values because those living in higher value properties will use 
infrastructure, services and amenities more?  Relatedly, the level of tax liability may not necessarily 
be correlated with ability to pay, so a mechanism might be required for taxpayers to defer payment 
until sale. 
 
Turning to the more technical aspects associated with a land tax, it requires a register of land 
ownership that records legally identifiable boundaries and permitted land use and development 
rights for all sites.  England does not have such a legal cadastre.  Moreover, England has a plan-led 
discretionary system for allocating land use rights, which is different from zoning systems that 
delineate permitted uses on an area-by-area basis, conveying development rights to landowners 
without the need for detailed approval. In a zoning system the assessment of permitted use is more 
straightforward than a plan-led discretionary system. 
 
It may be difficult to value land in isolation from improvements.  This is because valuations rely 
heavily on the availability of evidence to support assessed values, but evidence of sales of land 
without any improvements such as buildings, particularly within urban areas is often difficult to find.  
An alternative is to use an approach known as the ‘residual’ method, whereby build costs and other 






value.  The approach is used later in this paper, but it is worth noting here that it can produce 
confounding results. For example, take two dwellings side-by-side.  One is three-storey and 
developed to highest and best use (market value = £1m, build and other costs = £0.5m, so land value 
= £0.5m), the other is two-storey (market value = £0.7m, build and other costs = £0.3m, so land 
value = £0.4m).  The land value (and therefore the tax) of the first property is higher.  The 
relationship between property value and build cost is penalising the development of land to highest 
and best use, which is counterintuitive as far as a land tax is concerned. 
 
This problem could be addressed by valuing the land on which the two-storey property is 
constructed at its ‘highest and best use’, in other words assuming that it is developed to three-
storeys.  However, the difficulty then shifts to the identification of highest and best use.  One 
approach might be to make reference to planning policy for each plot of land and make a judgement 
as to whether the land is developed to its maximum reasonable capacity. However, this would be 
open to challenge. It would also be labour intensive and costly.  Nevertheless, it is an approach used 
in some countries, but normally where land use is ‘zoned’ for planning purposes.  Each land use zone 
is delineated and the highest and best use is established for each zone, within which property of 
different types would be taxed based on corresponding tax rates. This approach would need to be 
designed so as to acknowledge that not all land within such zones would be permitted to be 
developed to the zoned highest and best use by the planning system e.g. land within the setting of a 
sensitive heritage asset, or land which is used as public open space.  Therefore, with a zoned 
approach, some method is required to allow for adjustment at the individual parcel level. 
 
This raises another important point.  With a zoning system it is possible to base a land tax on the 
‘planned’ use of each piece of land, the ‘highest and best use’.  A discretionary planning system 
means that this is not possible since any change of legally permitted use only occurs once an 
application to do so has been granted consent.  What this means is that the land value on which a 
land tax is based may be assessed with reference to either its highest and best use (zoning system) 
or its current use (discretionary system).  The modelling undertaken for this paper is based on the 







Land tax is usually assessed as a proportion of market capital value1 of land but can also be based on 
market rental values. Rental values relate to market conditions but normally reflect existing use 
rather than how the property might be used if sold on the open market. Basing the tax on capital 
market value means that valuations will include ‘hope value’.  This is the value that purchasers of 
land pay in excess of the value for the permitted use.  It reflects – in financial terms – speculation 
that there might be a change of permitted use that would increase the value of the land.  Thus, if a 
purchaser acquires land at a price that incorporates hope value, he or she will be exposing 
themselves to a land tax liability based upon that value.  This point is explained in the quotation 
below. 
 
‘Agricultural land at a city’s edge is often more valuable for its development potential than for its 
agricultural production. If the land is taxed at its ‘market value’, meaning its value as developable 
land, farmers may not be able to continue farming because of high taxes. While many countries 
simply exclude agricultural land from the tax base, many others design a system which taxes 
agricultural land at its agricultural value rather than full market value.’ (UN 2011: 43) 
 
Basing land tax on assessments that include hope value could be open to challenge since its 
existence and extent are matters of judgement.  It might therefore be preferable to value land based 
on a highest and best use that could reasonably be assumed to be permitted under existing local 
planning policy, rather than including a proportion of value which is assumed to derive from the 
potential to gain a planning permission for a different and more valuable use in the future should 
planning policy change. If a ‘zoned use’ approach to planning is taken, this simplifies the issue, but 
does give rise to the need for ‘parcel adjustments’ for site specific characteristics.  A further difficulty 
arises when attempting to set the extent of highest and best use.  To illustrate the point, assume a 
local planning authority wishes to zone agricultural land for a new town.  Should each parcel of land 
be valued as though it were, say, residential use in isolation from any surrounding town 
development that might increase its value further?  That would seem fair since it follows the same 
approach as compensation for compulsory purchase of land.  The difficulty arises when trying to 
evidence such ‘no scheme’ land values. 
 
                                                 
1 There are other bases of assessment: soil quality for agricultural land; and replacement cost valuations for 






5. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF MOVING FROM A PROPERTY TAX TO A LAND TAX IN ENGLAND 
 
In 1964 the Rating and Valuation Association reported on a study that investigated the hypothetical 
impact of a land tax or ‘site value rating’ as it was referred to (Rating and Valuation Association, 
1964).  This study piloted site value rating in Whitstable, a small town of approximately 2,000 
residents in the county of Kent in south east England.  Annual values of sites were assessed based on 
full permissible development value in accordance with the ‘town map’.  All land was valued, 
including sites of churches and so on, which could later be exempted as appropriate.  The valuations 
were quite fine-grained; site-specific aspects such as frontage and proximity to value-enhancing and 
value-diminishing characteristics were taken into account.  Capital values were annualised at a rate 
of 4%.  The result of the study showed that the total value on the existing rating list (based on 
occupied taxable units) was £724,100 whereas the site value list (based on owned land units) was 
£642,254, of which £14,504 (2%) was from agricultural land. 
 
A follow up study (Land Institute, 1973) used the same approach.  Interestingly, as far as the 
approach adopted in this paper is concerned, the study found a ‘remarkable consistency’ between 
land values obtained by deducting improvements from total sale price (i.e. a residual approach), and 
the few transactions involving bare land that were available at the time.  As with the 1964 study, a 
relatively ad hoc decision was made to use a rate of 6% to annualise capital values.  The 1973 study 
reported an increase in rateable value from £3,186,543 under the existing rating system to 
£4,531,093 under a site value rating system, opposite to the decrease reported in the 1964 study.  
There may be several reasons for this, but a likely contender is the rapidly growing value of land over 
the decade. 
 
Thirty years later McGill and Plimmer (2004) revisited the two Whitstable pilot studies and, of 
particular relevance to this paper, looked in some detail at the predicted winners and losers.  Those 
who stood to gain were owners of dwellings, retail, commercial and industrial properties, schools 
and playing fields, hospitals and homes.  Some of the decreases in assessed value were substantial.  
Such reductions can be countered by raising the tax rate but, unless differential rates are 
implemented, there would be a significant shift in relative liabilities.  Increases in value related, in 
the main, to public uses of land. The exception was agricultural land use, but this was previously 
untaxed.  What the study seems to show is that replacing a property tax with a land tax means that, 






a tax based on land value only.  However, the tax burden may be redistributed so that those in the 
most valuable locations pay the most tax, regardless of the value of property on the land.  
 
A great deal has changed since the Whitstable study and, given rising land values resulting from 
increased development pressures, particularly for residential development, it seems appropriate to 





The method adopted for this research is a case study.  Reading, a large town situated 60 kilometres 
west of London in the south east of England, was selected as the study location. The area is 
administered by Reading Borough Council and has a population of approximately 163,000 residents 
and an area of just over 40 square kilometres. It comprises mainly urban land uses but with some 
rural land uses, and a mix of large and small owners and occupiers of land and property.  Table 4 
summarises the Council Tax base for the borough and Table 5 summarises the Business Rates base. 
 
Table 4: Council Tax in Reading, 2017-18 
Band Property value 
Charge 
2017/18 




A up to £40,000 1148.89 6,450 (9%) 7,410,341 
B £40,001 to £52,000 1340.36 14,010 (20%) 18,778,444 
C £52,001 to £68,000 1531.85 28,670 (41%) 43,918,140 
D £68,001 to £88,000 1723.33 10,860 (15%) 18,715,364 
E £88,001 to £120,000 2106.30 5,430 (8%) 11,437,209 
F £120,001-£160,000 2489.25 3,270 (5%) 8,139,848 
G £160,001-£320,000 2872.22 1,840 (3%) 5,284,885 
H £320,000 and over 3446.66 80 (-) 275,733 
TOTAL 70,600 113,959,964 
 
Table 5: Business Rates in Reading, 2017-182 
                                                 
2 The Rating List downloaded from the Valuation Office Agency’s website (voa.gov.uk) on the 15th July 2017 










(% of total) 
Retail and Leisure 2,158 (40%) £116,850,590 (37%) 
Offices 1,614 (30%) £111,142,825 (35%) 
Factories and warehouses 886 (16%) £46,842,495 (15%) 
Other 790 (15%) £38,515,553 (12%) 
TOTAL 5,448 £313,351,463 
 
Council Tax revenue before reliefs was £114 million spread over 70,600 dwellings, an average of 
£1,600 per dwelling.  To calculate the revenue from business rates it is necessary to multiply the 
rateable value by the Uniform Business Rate (UBR).  Small businesses – those with a rateable value 
below £51,000 are assigned a lower UBR.  The total rateable value of these small businesses in the 
current rating list for Reading is £55 million.  With a UBR of 0.466, this produces a revenue before 
reliefs of £26 million.  The total rateable value of properties with a rateable value of £51,000 or more 
is £258 million and, with a UBR of 0.479, the gross revenue is £124 million.  This makes a total 
Business Rates revenue before reliefs of £150 million, an average of £27,000 per business property. 
 
Net of reliefs, revenue from Council Tax in 2017/18 was £92 million, equating to £1,300 per dwelling, 
and from Business Rates it was £124 million3 equating to £23,000 per property.  The total recurrent 
land and property tax revenue for Reading in 2017/18 is, therefore, £216 million.  To be revenue 
neutral, a land tax must yield this amount of revenue. 
 
Table 6 categorises land use in Reading and summarises their areas. Figure 2 shows the 1,339 land 
use polygons on a map.  In practice, some uses are likely to be exempt from a land tax so only those 




                                                 
these properties were temporary structures which, although in the Rating List, are not assessed for rating 
purposes. 






Table 6: Land use in Reading 
Code Land use description Area (m2) 
 Inland water 1,015,156 
 Open or heath and moorland 1,868,069 
a Agriculture - mainly crops 4,704,744 
b Glass houses 5,189 
c Farms 19,138 
d Deciduous woodland 662,151 
e Coniferous and undifferentiated woodland 208,874 
 Principal transport road 5,382,868 
 Principal transport rail 342,836 
 Recreational land 3,322,058 
f Large complex buildings various use (travel/recreation/retail) 346,601 
g Low density residential with amenities (suburbs and small 
villages/hamlets) 
15,421,783 
h Medium density residential with high streets and amenities 4,029,255 
i High density residential with retail and commercial sites 570,369 
j Urban centres - mainly commercial/retail with residential pockets 188,501 
k Industrial areas 1,650,663 
l Business parks 187,627 
m Retail parks 245,176 
n Primarily large commercial/industrial sites 213,022 








Figure 2: Land use in Reading 







These land use areas were used to calculate the land tax revenue for Reading using a residual 
valuation model in which estimated build costs are deducted from property values to arrive at land 
values.  Separate valuation models were constructed for the non-domestic and domestic land uses 
listed in table 7.  The residual method is therefore applied to the land uses that exist in Reading at 
the moment.  If the tax was to be based on optimum rather than existing use then different land 
uses and possibly higher densities would be assumed. 
 
Table 7: Land uses 
Land Use Land use code from Table 4 
Agriculture a, b, c, d, e 
Retail and leisure f, j/2, m 
Office j/2, l, n/2 
Industrial and storage k, n/2 
Detached houses g 
Semi-detached houses g 
Terraced houses h 
Apartments i 
 
The residual valuations were based on the land use specific assumptions set out in table 8.  The 
values of residential units were based on transaction prices obtained from the Office for National 
Statistics4.  Rental values and investment yields for retail, office and industrial space were obtained 
from CoStar5.  Agricultural land values were based on estimates published by the UK Government 
(MHCLG, 2018a). 
 
Build cost estimates6 were obtained from the Building Cost Information Service7 of the Royal 
Institution of Chartered Surveyors.  Planning costs are assumed to cover any planning obligations 
and community infrastructure levy that may be required.  Building sizes were obtained from CABE 
(2010) and DLCG (2016).  Development density or floorspace-to-land ratio is a difficult metric to find 
evidence for.  In 2017 the Government’s Land Use Change Statistics recorded a density of 32 
                                                 
4 House Price Statistics for Small Areas (HPSSAs). HPSSA Dataset 12. Mean price paid for administrative 
geographies. 
5 www.costar.co.uk  
6 Mean average costs (including preliminary costs) per square metre of gross internal area of new space in 
Reading for the fourth quarter of 2017. 






addresses per hectare on for new developments, but higher at 40 addresses on previously 
developed or brownfield land and lower at 26 addresses on non-previously developed or greenfield 
land (MHCLG, 2018b).   Assuming an average dwelling size of 90 square metres that equates to 4,000 
square metres of residential floorspace per hectare, i.e. 40% density.  Indicative density for Reading 
town centre is 100 dwellings per hectare (dph) or higher, for urban areas it is 60-120 dph and for 
suburban it is 30-60 dph8.  The densities for town and city centres – where apartments are assumed 
to be the predominant form for residential development – is in line with the assumption made in 
DCLG (2015)9.  Densities for commercial land uses are very difficult to find evidence for.  Town 
centres may be close to 100% site coverage, more for office space. 
 

















Values (£/m2) £4,035 £4,456 £4,029 £4,796 £4,508 £3,607 £1,818 
Build cost 
(£/m2) 
£1,599 £1,332 £1,309 £1,534 £1,905 £1,500 £1,119 
External works 
(% build cost) 
15% 15% 15% 15% 10% 10% 10% 
Planning costs 
(% value) 
15% 15% 15% 15% 5% 5% 0% 
Net:gross floor 
area ratio 














- - - 
Floorspace:plot 
size ratio10 
200% 50% 40% 30% 300% 200% 100% 







In addition to the land use specific assumptions itemised in table 8, the following generic 
assumptions were also made: 
 
 Finance at 6% per annum on half build costs and fees over the building period 
                                                 
8 Draft Reading Borough Plan, May 2017, p66, Reading Borough Council 
9 In that report it was assumed that a hypothetical scheme for a one-hectare (10,000m2) site would be a multi-
storey development of 269 units comprising one, two, three and four bed flats with a gross building area of 
23,202m2 and a net sales area of 19,722m2. 
 
 






 Land acquisition costs (Stamp Duty Land Tax plus legal and agent’s fees) at 6.5% of land price 
 Developer’s return at 20% of development value 
 Fees for construction professionals at 12.5% of build costs 
 Marketing and sale costs at 2% development value 
 
The residual valuation model, and its application to each of the land uses, is shown in the appendix.  





Table 9 shows the resultant land values from the residual model for each land use together with the 
tax revenue.  A tax rate of 3.00% is required to approximately match the revenue from the current 
property taxes. 
 
Table 9: Land tax results from the residual model 
Land use Area (m2) Land value 
(£/ha) 
Land value (£) Tax revenue 




Commercial (city centre) 188,501 22,315,579 420,651,465 12,619,544 66.95 
Commercial (out of town) 885,915 11,902,038 1,054,419,865 31,632,596 35.71 
Residential (low density) 15,421,783 2,441,527 3,765,269,469 112,958,084 7.32 
Residential (medium 
density) 4,029,255 3,349,019 1,349,405,153 40,482,155 10.05 
Residential (high density) 570,369 9,269,725 528,716,808 15,861,504 27.81 
Industrial 1,757,174 125,137 21,988,727 659,662 0.38 






The proportion of total tax revenue that is generated by agricultural land is very small, although it 
should be noted that the amount of agricultural land in the Reading borough is very low.  By far the 






case for many parts of England, particularly in the south east, because of the combination of high 
land values and low density (land extensive) development. 
 
So the taxable land in Reading is valued at a total of £7.2 billion and this generates a tax revenue of 
approximately £215 million assuming a tax rate of 3%, close to the £216 million generated from 
current Council Tax and Business Rates.  However, the rate is not the crucial issue here.  What is 
particularly noteworthy is the shift of tax liability from businesses to residents.  In 2017 businesses 
generated 57% of revenue from recurrent property taxes in Reading (the same proportion as for 
England as a whole) and residents generated the remaining 43%.  The land tax shifts the burden 
substantially from business (21% of revenue) to residents (79% of revenue). 
 
This shift is, in part, an outcome of different tax rates that are currently applied to domestic and 
non-domestic properties.  As a proportion of capital value, the tax rate on non-domestic properties 
is higher than for domestic properties. In December 2017 the average house price in Reading was 
£311,823 and the average Council Tax Bill was £1,365 or 0.4% of capital value.  For non-domestic 
property the uniform business rate was 47.9% in 2017/18 and, if we assume a capitalisation rate of 
6%, this is an effective tax rate on capital value of 2.9%.  If, under a new land tax, a common tax rate 
is applied, then there will be a substantial redistribution of the tax burden from non-domestic to 
domestic properties.  The expectation is that the redistribution would be less marked for dwellings 
in high Council Tax bands, but this depends on the relative sizes of land parcels across the Council 
Tax value bands; low value dwellings with large plots may see a large redistribution. 
 
In order to look further at the revenue implications of switching from an occupier tax to ownership 
tax, it is useful to examine the size and composition of the tax base.  To begin, it is possible to tally 
the number of taxpayers in Reading under the current property tax system and compare that with 
the number of ownership parcels.  Freehold parcel extents are published by the Land Registry and 
these are illustrated in red outline for the centre of Reading in figure 3, overlaying the land use map 
(from figure 2).  In total there are 55,014 freehold parcels covering the whole of the Reading 
borough, although there are a few gaps where land has not been registered yet.  This contrasts with 
the 70,600 dwellings that are liable for Council tax and 5,448 properties liable for Business rates.  
This is a total of 76,048 taxable entities.  Therefore, a switch to a land tax on owners would see a 








Figure 3: Freehold parcel extents (red outlines) for central Reading, overlaying the land use map 
Source: The HM Land Registry INSPIRE Index Polygons dataset is subject to Crown copyright and is 
reproduced with the permission of HM Land Registry 
(© Crown copyright and database rights 2018 Ordnance Survey 100026316) 
 
The next step is to take a more detailed look at land uses of the freehold parcels, both in terms of 
number of parcels and land area.  This requires a spatial overlay using a GIS to allocate each freehold 
parcel to a land use.  For most parcels this is straightforward as they can be entirely allocated to the 
relevant land use.  A small number, though, straddle more than one land use.  In these cases, the 
freehold parcel was duplicated and allocated to each land use that it straddled.  This explains why 








Table 10: Taxation of freeholds in Reading 
 Land use Area (m2) Number of 
freeholds 






Commercial (city centre) 188,501 364 518 66.95 34,669 
Commercial (out of town) 885,915 332 2,668 35.71 95,279 
Residential (low density) 15,421,783 36,583 422 7.32 3,088 
Residential (medium density) 4,029,255 16,056 251 10.05 2,521 
Residential (high density) 570,369 1,235 462 27.81 12,843 
Industrial 1,757,174 1,193 1,473 0.38 553 
Agriculture 5,600,067 1,181 4,742 0.07 320 
TOTAL 28,453,065 56,944 
   
 
Looking at the switch from the current property taxes to a land tax, compared to 5,448 business 
rates properties, there are 1,877 freeholds classified as commercial and industrial.  Compared to 
70,600 Council Tax dwellings, there are 53,874 freeholds classified as residential land use.  The 1,181 
freeholds classified as agricultural would be new to the tax base.  The average area per freehold is 
also shown in the table, and this allows calculation of the average tax liability per entity.  The tax per 
agricultural land owner is very low due to their small size (a little under half of one hectare on 
average).  This reflects the composition of agricultural land ownership in the Reading borough which 
contains mainly small land holdings, which tend to be more valuable per unit area than large farms. 
 
For city centre and out of town commercial land, the tax liability per freehold is much higher 
(£35,000 and £95,000 respectively, compared to £23,000 per property under Business Rates in 
2017).  Many of these freeholds, and particularly those located out of town, will comprise multiple 
occupiers in office buildings, shopping centres, retail and business parks.  The major shift is for 
residential dwellings; the average Council Tax bill was £1,300 per dwelling in 2017 but under the 
modelled land tax this would increase to £3,000 for low density, £2,500 for medium density and 
£13,000 for high density residential freeholds.  The high-density amount is much higher because 
each freeholder is likely to have multiple residential occupiers and the tax liability would probably be 









The two research questions were: how might the valuation of land be undertaken in England where 
most transactional evidence relates to land and property and what are the revenue implications of 
switching from a tax where the liability falls on the land owner rather than the property occupier in 
first instance? 
 
The lack of transactional evidence for land sales is a significant concern for land tax administration.  
What little evidence there is often requires adjustment to account for differences between parcels, 
not least as a result of locational differences that can have a substantial influence on value.  Land 
prices may also reflect alternative use value and development (hope) value and, if a land tax is based 
on such prices, owners may have difficulty in paying tax if they are using the land for a lower value 
use.  For example, the owner of an organic farm may be required to pay a tax based on land value 
that assumes the farm is used for intensive farming.  Would government wish to penalise land 
owners who choose not to maximise economic value?  Instead, a residual valuation model values 
land in its existing use and resorts to more fundamental evidence of build costs and property values 
to derive land value. 
 
Switching from a property tax to a land tax is likely to create winners and losers, yet the scale of the 
shift from businesses to residents is considerable; from entities that don’t vote to those that do, and 
this perhaps explains why it has never been done.  Of course, the use of different tax rates can 
alleviate the shift and land owners would probably attempt to pass on the tax burden to occupiers in 
the form of rent or service charge, but this would only be possible where the market allows.  Turning 
finally to agricultural land, expansion of the tax base to include this land use has a marginal impact in 
Reading but is likely to be more contributory where such land is more dominant in relation to urban 
land uses. 
 
It is important to recognise that detailed and up to date land ownership records are essential, as is 
the existence of comprehensive land use planning and development control system.  After all, land 
use allocation is a key value influence, and land values are very sensitive to planning assumptions.  
Further research will examine a rural case study area to investigate in more detail the implications of 
including agricultural land in the tax base.  Areas of investigation are likely to include the 
requirements for a complete and up to date register of land ownership, establishing highest and best 
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APPENDIX: Residual Model          
 
DEVELOPMENT VALUE: Apartments Terraced 
Semi-





Mean price paid for each dwelling (£) 246,117 316,373 386,818 580,276  Rent (£/m2) 275 275 100 
Average size (sqm GIA) 61 71 96 121  Yield (%) 6.10% 6.10% 5.50% 
Mean price paid per square metre 
(£/sqm GIA) 4035 4456 4029 4796  Gross Development Value (£/m2) 4508 4508 1818 
Sale costs (% Development Value) 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00%  Sale costs (% Development Value) 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 
Development value (£/sqm) 3956 4369 3950 4702  Development value (£/m2) 4420 4420 1783 
          
DEVELOPMENT COSTS:      DEVELOPMENT COSTS:    
Build cost (£/sqm GIA) 1599 1332 1309 1534  Build cost (£/m2 GIA) 1905 1500 1119 
Professional fees (% build costs) 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5%  Professional fees (% build costs) 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
Site, infrastructure and abnormal 
costs (% build costs) 15% 15% 15% 15%  
Site, infrastructure and abnormal 
costs (% build costs) 10% 10% 10% 
Planning costs (% development value) 15% 15% 15% 15%  Planning costs (% development value) 5% 5% 0% 
Construction cost (£/sqm) 2632 2354 2262 2661  Construction cost (£/m2) 2555 2058 1371 
Loan (% p.a.) 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%  Loan (% p.a.) 6.00% 6.00% 6.00% 
Development period (yrs) 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00  Development period (yrs) 1.50 1.50 1.00 
Finance cost (£/sqm) 163 145 140 164  Finance cost (£/m2) 117 94 41 
Developer's return (% development 
value) 20% 20% 20% 20%  
Developer's return (% development 
value) 20% 20% 20% 
Developer's return (£/sqm) 791 874 790 940  Developer's return (£/m2) 884 884 357 
Development cost (£/sqm) 3586 3373 3191 3766  Development cost (£/m2) 3555 3036 1768 
Land purchase costs (% RLV) 6.50% 6.50% 6.50% 6.50%  Land purchase costs (% RLV) 6.50% 6.50% 6.50% 
          
Residual Land Value (£/sqm) 309 832 634 782  Residual Land Value (£/m2) 744 1190 13 
Density 300% 50% 40% 30%  Density 300% 100% 100% 
RLV (£/ha) 9,269,725 4,160,960 2,537,078 2,345,976  
RLV (£/ha based on specified density) 
(Eng) 22,315,579 11,902,038 125,137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
